Beyond Reasons, Is There Irrationality? Argument and Rational Resolution in Deep Disagreements

Abstract

In his paper, "The Logic of Deep Disagreements", Fogelin sets up a controversy when he claims that there are some kind of disagreements, which he calls "deep disagreements", where the clash of principles and rules of resolution underlying the discussion makes it impossible to carry out rational argumentation. This paper looks into this problem, questioning the conclusions that Fogelin establishes. To do so I pick up the R. Feldman's paper, responding Fogelin, where the author suggests that suspension of judgment is a possible rational response in deep disagreements: according to Feldman, a disagreement is rationally resolved not only if one of the participants in the disagreement comes around to the other\'s point of view, but also when both of them suspend judgment about the issue. Although it is an interesting suggestion, this paper questions the validity of his conclusions, given that it ends up establishing very sharp limits between the rational and the irrational, in Fogelin's same style. In this way, leaves out of rationality's sphere many of the stands and arguments which we take and put forward in disagreements.