Can thinking machines exist? Possible answers from Mario Bunge's emergentist materialism

Abstract

The article investigates the classic question of whether or not computers can think. Our main reference framework for this study will be the reflections developed in this field by Mario Bunge, a representative of emergentist materialism. We will also consider some contributions from Gustavo Esteban Romero. Firstly, we will refer to the computational theory of mind, or computationalism, the main model used by philosophers, scientists, and engineers who advocate the possibility of finding thought in computers. Subsequently, we will refer to the most relevant points of Bunge's stance on the matter and partially reconstruct his philosophy of mind, considering the consequences it has for the problem at hand. We will also address the issue of inverse problems, their characterization, and their relationship with algorithmic resolution. Finally, we will highlight counterpoints with Romero's vision. We will conclude that, under Bunge's emergentist materialism, it is not possible to assert that computers can think.