Artículos originales
EPISTEMOLOGÍA SIN SUJETO COGNOSCENTE. : SUPERACIÓN, DISOLUCIÓN O SUJECIÓN DE LA SUBJETIVIDAD EN POPPER, WITTGENSTEIN Y FOUCAULT
Published 2013-06-06
Keywords
- Wittgenstein,
- Popper,
- Foucault
How to Cite
Rivera , S. (2013). EPISTEMOLOGÍA SIN SUJETO COGNOSCENTE. : SUPERACIÓN, DISOLUCIÓN O SUJECIÓN DE LA SUBJETIVIDAD EN POPPER, WITTGENSTEIN Y FOUCAULT. Estudios De Epistemología, 10, 82–101. Retrieved from https://estudiosepistemologia.ct.unt.edu.ar/article/view/38
Abstract
The existence of a common proposition, in the work of authors that belong to different epistemological traditions, such as Wittgenstein, Popper and Foucault, has encouraged the development of a “compared epistemology” as Enrique Marí has proposed. In the first instance, the exercise of a “compared epistemology” allows us to examine the consequences that follow the explicit rejection of the subject of knowledge in the work of the aforedmentioned authors.